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Not Very Big  




Currently, the United States spends more than 
$10,000 per person each year on health care, roughly 
18% of gross domestic product1 and far more than 
other high-income countries.2 At the same time, close 
to 80% of the population consistently worry about 
access to necessary care.3 There are news reports of 
turmoil in the individual insurance marketplace, with 
insurers raising prices and threatening to leave mar-
kets in the face of both political instability and market 
pricing problems as state governments, Congress and 
CMS attempt numerous schemes for the purpose of 
supporting private insurers so that insurance is avail-
able and affordable.4
It is not a leap, in light of these facts, to question 
what private insurance offers the United States and 
if creating a single, tax payer funded national pool 
would, in fact, cause upheaval or loss by disturbing 
this industry. 
On July 29, 2018, the Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services (CMS) approved a waiver for the 
Wisconsin healthcare marketplace.5 This waiver, 
known as a §1332 waiver,6 creates a federally and state 
funded reinsurance or stop-loss program for indi-
vidual insurance policies sold on the state exchange. 
Between 50% and 80% of claims between $50,000 
and $250,000 will be paid with tax dollars, with a pre-
dicted 83% of the $200 million cost of the program 
coming from federal funds.7 The assumption underly-
ing the waiver is that volatility and pricing problems 
in the marketplace will be reduced by this plan, reduc-
ing federal premium subsidies overall, which reduc-
tion, in turn, will fund the waiver.
This waiver and its economic assumptions are one 
example of why a national health insurance pool, 
funded by tax dollars, will not destabilize the economy 
by interrupting a functioning and effective private 
insurer marketplace but, rather, will bring stability 
and lead to a more efficient and rational insurance 
pool. The waiver’s very existence is evidence that 
health insurance is not functioning well. As explained 
below, these problems extend beyond the individual 
marketplace into the entire industry.
With the Wisconsin 1332 waiver, the federal gov-
ernment takes on the task of providing insurance, 
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using tax dollars to both shore up the health insurance 
industry’s ability to handle health care costs and con-
tinue providing the money to pay premiums, as they 
are too expensive for many people to afford them-
selves. Realistically, these are the only two jobs health 
insurers have, providing insurance with affordable 
premiums, and in Wisconsin’s waiver, we see they can-
not perform them.
Given that health care is a significant portion of 
the United States economy, however, it is important 
to consider how large the financial implications of 
dramatically changing the health insurance industry 
truly are. As discussed in more detail below, the health 
insurance industry is not primarily involved in actu-
ally handling the tasks associated with insurance for 
the majority of Americans, given that it only insures 
a relatively small percentage of them, is heavily subsi-
dized by federal and state tax dollars, and has a busi-
ness model that shifts risks of medical costs to other 
parties, carrying relatively little of it itself. Addition-
ally, insurance companies already handle claims pro-
cessing for Medicare8 and could do so for a new pool, 
further minimizing any disruption.
The Relatively Small Size of the Private 
Health Insurance Marketplace
There are 328 million people in the United States. Of 
these, 27% (87 million) have insurance provided by 
a private health insurance company as defined here. 
This is a significant number, but not an exceptionally 
large market share. As of 2018, 44% of the popula-
tion (around 146 million people) are provided health 
insurance through programs run by federal or state 
governments. According to Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services (CMS) data, as of 2018, 59.1 mil-
lion people were enrolled in Medicare (federal health 
insurance for the elderly or disabled);9 and 80 million 
people were enrolled in Medicaid (combined federal 
and state health insurance for low income people) and 
CHIP (a federal program for children of families with 
low income).10 Additionally, 9.4 million people receive 
coverage through Tricare (federal health insurance 
for active duty military and their families)11 and more 
than 9 million people are cared for by the Veteran’s 
Administration (VA) (federal health insurance for 
military veterans).12 The coverage numbers above are 
then reduced by the people who are enrolled in both 
Medicare and Medicaid (known as dual coverage), 
which totaled 11.7 million people in 201613 thus total-
ing 146. Additionally, as of 2016, around 28 million 
people had no health insurance, meaning they were 
not currently enrolled in any program.14 
Almost half of the country receives health insur-
ance through a family member’s or their own employer 
(49%,15 161 million people as of 2018) but, due to effi-
ciency concerns and federal law incentives, a large 
number of employer insurance plans are “self-insured,” 
meaning that the company is responsible for pay-
ing all healthcare costs rather than purchasing group 
coverage from an existing insurance company.16 Over-
all, 60% of all employees (96.6 million people) with 
employer-sponsored coverage are in self-insured plans, 
the majority of them in large companies.17 While these 
self-insured companies often hire health insurance 
providers to manage the benefits offered, the health 
insurance companies are not insuring the beneficiaries.
Widespread Use of Stop Loss Insurance and 
Reinsurance 
Private insurers carry relatively little risk of having to 
pay for expensive medical care due to their widespread 
use of stop loss insurance. This can be provided by 
governments, as in the example from Wisconsin given 
above, purchased from reinsurance or stop loss com-
panies, or provided through complex financial trans-
actions with sophisticated investors. The idea that 
health insurers are not actually insuring is counterin-
tuitive, but in fact they often function as middlemen, 
bundling and selling risk.18 
the health insurance industry is not primarily involved in actually handling 
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next steps in health reform • winter 2018 879
Fox
The Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics, 46 (2018): 877-882. © 2018 The Author(s)
For purposes of this discussion, it is helpful to 
think of a typical health insurance policy as allocat-
ing risk of loss. The funds insurers use to pay health-
care expenses come from premiums that are put into 
a pool. Purchasers of insurance are the beneficiaries 
of this pool. Beneficiaries who require care also have 
additional expenses in addition to their premiums. 
A policy generally has a deductible (the amount the 
beneficiary must pay before the insurance company 
pays anything). There is often a co-payment (a small 
amount paid for every doctor or hospital visit) and 
co-insurance (the set percentage of costs that the ben-
eficiary will pay after paying the deductible), as well. 
Finally, most insurance policies have a cap on benefi-
ciary payments, past which the insurance company 
covers the full cost of care for the rest of the calendar 
year. A typical plan might have a $1000 deductible for 
an individual, a $20 co-payment, 20% co-insurance, 
and a cap of $12,000.19 There might also be separate 
deductions and co-payments for pharmaceuticals.
Looking at the arrangement described above, the 
risk of loss in the plan is transparently broken into a 
few tranches (or segments). The beneficiary has the 
risk of loss for the first $1000 of care they might need 
in any given year. They are, in effect, self-insured for 
this. Once they exceed $1000, they share the risk with 
the insurance company, 20/80, until they have spent 
$12,000 and then bear no risk of loss for medical costs 
until the next year. Their total self-insurance liability 
is $12,000. With no reinsurance, an insurance com-
pany would then bear the risk of loss for any expenses 
that exceed the amount paid for by the beneficiary. 
That loss, in turn, would be paid from the pool of all 
beneficiaries’ premiums. 
Given that health insurance companies divide risk 
into the tranches described above in most insurance 
contracts, it is not surprising that they also purchase 
reinsurance for specific levels of claims or costs from 
numerous companies. Simply put, the money to pur-
chase the reinsurance comes from the pool of premi-
ums and is used to insure the pool. This behavior is 
commonplace in the insurance marketplace and not 
nefarious. However, it highlights how health insur-
ance companies often do not actually function as tra-
ditional insurers in that they generally do not bear the 
risk for larger and/or catastrophic costs, instead pur-
chasing coverage from other entities.
The use of reinsurance and stop loss coverage for 
both private insurers and self-insured employers high-
lights the risk exposure benefits of large health insur-
ance pools and its corollary, the increased exposure 
of smaller ones. It is extremely difficult to devise an 
insurance product that can cover a small population 
for a small chance of an extremely expensive event. It 
is possible, even likely, that the expensive event will 
never occur, but if it does, the cost is beyond what a 
small group can reasonably collect by pooling their 
resources. In a bigger pool, it is far more likely the 
event will happen, but the cost is spread out. 
An example would be if a small community decided 
to create its own fire insurance pool. Accounting for 
the chance of the occasional fire would be fairly easy. A 
fire that spread across an entire neighborhood would 
be catastrophic, rare, and most likely drain the insur-
ance resources. Multiple neighborhood fires would be 
even more rare and more financially unbearable. If the 
pool contained thousands of diverse small communi-
ties, however, the larger pool could flatten that spike 
of risk exposure. Having multiple communities in the 
pool increases the likelihood of a spreading fire, but 
the risk would be spread across many more people. 
The same logic that applies to the fire insurance 
example above applies to health insurance, but with 
healthcare many more potentially catastrophic events 
have to be considered, making it more complex to pre-
dict for a small group.20 Premature births, motorcycle 
accidents with brain injuries, and multiple organ trans-
plants happen, but rarely. The larger and more diverse 
the pool, the easier it is to flatten all risk spikes across 
all participants because a small chance of something 
happening becomes a known cost if the population is 
big enough and those costs can be accounted for. 
For both self-insured employers and private insur-
ers, these spikes are managed by purchasing reinsur-
ance from large reinsurance companies. There are two 
main types of reinsurance, ones that protect an insurer 
from excessive claims overall (generally referred to as 
reinsurance), and ones that function, like the Wiscon-
sin waiver, to cover expensive claims (known as stop 
loss insurance for self-insured plans and as excess 
medical reinsurance for health insurers). Little data 
exists regarding the dollar amount of individual claims 
for which insurers or self-insured plans purchase rein-
surance. However, it is possible to deduce common 
levels by examining laws seeking to limit exceptionally 
low stop loss coverage (also known as the “attachment 
point”). Maryland, for example, recently temporarily 
raised its limit from $10,000 to $22,500.21 In 2002, 
the National Association of Insurance Commission-
ers proposed a model law that prohibited the sale of 
stop loss insurance with an attachment point below 
$20,000.22 In addition, 60% of reinsurance of this 
type sold in the United States has an attachment point 
“less than” $150,000 per covered individual.23
Revisiting the typical insurance contract described 
above, the beneficiary has the first $1000 of risk, and 
then has some share of risk up to $12,000. Using the 
co-payments outlined above, a patient would have 
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$56,000 of medical bills by the time they reached their 
maximum out of pocket costs. The insurance company 
would have $44,000 of liability. It is plausible, given 
the availability of stop loss insurance products with 
low attachment points, that the beneficiary could be 
bearing a share of the risk while a different company 
bears the rest.24 
It is unclear how commonplace these contracts are 
with private insurers, as there is no reporting require-
ment and the companies, themselves, rarely acknowl-
edge this system apart from within filings required 
from publicly traded, for profit companies. The prod-
ucts, however, are widely available and the reinsurance 
marketplace reports consistent growth in healthcare. 
Federal and State Subsidies in the Individual 
Marketplace
The individual health insurance marketplace is a 
relatively public and transparent area where one can 
clearly observe the limitations of the private insur-
ance companies. Close to 12 million people purchase 
their insurance on a health insurance exchange25 cre-
ated by the Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act (ACA).26 The ACA also created a series of tem-
porary risk management programs to help smooth 
spikes of cost in small, new, and/or untested pools as 
the individual insurance market expanded. These pro-
grams, known as the Three Rs, included risk adjust-
ment (shifting money from insurers who had less 
risky populations to those with riskier populations), 
reinsurance (collecting money from all health insur-
ers and using that finite pool of funds to offset rela-
tively expensive claims histories), and risk corridors 
(a method of redistributing outsized insurance com-
pany profits to companies with higher costs).27 The 
Three Rs, in a limited manner, combined the pools of 
all insurers in an area, using the combined funds to 
offset spikes that any one individual insurer had in its 
smaller pool and did so to encourage insurers to enter 
these marketplaces. 
As the Three Rs wind down, the 1332 waivers such 
as Wisconsin’s are now appearing, offering direct fed-
eral subsidization through stop loss coverage under 
the theory that this will reduce the cost of insurance 
overall, rendering the subsidies budget neutral. It 
should be noted that the Congressional Budget Office 
(CBO) does not necessarily agree with HHS and Wis-
consin projections regarding the cost of this type of 
program, as it predicted a similar nationwide stop loss 
program would cost the federal government $6.8 bil-
lion each year.28 
Wisconsin’s waiver is important because it shows 
that a national taxpayer-based funding mechanism 
is uniquely situated to spread risk across the broad-
est possible population and that this is likely to reduce 
insurance costs. The waiver also shows that private 
insurers are not functioning well in the insurance 
marketplace, given that such a subsidy is required.
Looking at the insurance contract example again, 
with Wisconsin’s waiver, the beneficiary would stop 
paying co-insurance when their care reached a cost of 
$56,000. The federal government would begin pay-
ing for their care when it reached $50,000. Assum-
ing a prudent insurance company that has purchased 
The individual health insurance marketplace is a relatively public and 
transparent area where one can clearly observe the limitations of the private 
insurance companies. Close to 12 million people purchase their insurance  
on a health insurance exchange created by the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act (ACA). The ACA also created a series of temporary risk 
management programs to help smooth spikes of cost in small, new,  
and/or untested pools as the individual insurance market expanded.  
These programs, known as the Three Rs, included risk adjustment  
(shifting money from insurers who had less risky populations to those with 
riskier populations), reinsurance (collecting money from all health insurers 
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reinsurance for claims that exceed $250,000 (the end 
of the federal subsidy), the insurance company would 
have a maximum risk of loss of $38,000 for that 
beneficiary. 
Conclusion
In conclusion, the private insurance market insures a 
relatively small proportion of the country, and, due to 
reinsurance, stop loss coverage, and various forms of 
governmental subsidies, does not provide a substan-
tial amount of actual insurance. Furthermore, private 
insurers cannot actually carry the risk of the small 
pools they work with. This flaw is deeply embedded 
in the system itself, as they cannot escape exposure 
to ruinous spikes of loss without cobbling together 
numerous inefficient methods of offsetting these risks 
to others. A national health insurance pool would 
be more efficient at spreading risk and less volatile. 
Given the industry’s current business model, where it 
appears to do relatively little insuring and instead pri-
marily manages benefits and serves as a middleman 
that arranges for other insurers to carry its risks, shift-
ing the industry to managing benefits for a federal 
program would not be a change of sufficient magni-
tude to justify forgoing the benefits of a national pool.
Note
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